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Rotondo: Helping Families Help Themselves: Using Child Support Enforcement

COMMENT
HELPING FAMILIES HELP THEMSELVES: USING CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT TO REFORM
OUR WELFARE SYSTEM
The audience grows silent as a modestly dressed woman takes her place

behind the podium. Looking aroundthe room she begins, "Iwould not need
to come before you today as a recipient of public assistance ifsomeone,
somewhere would assistme in getting the $341 a month in child supportthat

rightfully belongs to my two children. Because I receive nothingfrom the
father of the children I care for by myself, I have become dependent on
AFDC, MediCalandmore-because,simply stated,he refuses to do his 'Yob"
in supporting his children.'
INTRODUCTION

The critical link between welfare rolls and delinquent child support

payments has largely been neglected by legislatures and commentators. Its
effect on women is especially significant, given the fact that 89% of the
families on welfare are headed by single women.' In 1994, only 12.5% of
welfare households headed by single parents received child support from their
children's non-custodial parents.' Were it not for the efforts of the federally
funded Child Support Enforcement Program, which uses sanctions to force
fathers' to pay child support orders, even fewer welfare families would

1. This quote is paraphrased from a welfare mother's statement at a public forum on
welfare reform, held before the County of San Diego Board of Supervisors on December 10,
1996. Interview with Carol Drummond, Communications Coordinator, San Diego Dept. of
Social Services (January 24, 1997).
2. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, § 101, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. sec. 601 note
(1997)).
3. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH ANDHUMAN SERV.,
NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONG. (1995)

at 39 [hereinafter

NINETEENTH ANNUAL

REPORT]. For the ease of discussion, this paper mentions welfare families receiving child
support. In actuality, the payments made to families on welfare are actually paid to the state for
the period that the family is on welfare, in order to reimburse the state for the welfare payments
it makes to that family. Personal Responsibility Act, § 302(a), 110 Stat. at 2200 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. see. 657, § 457(a)(1) (1997)).
4. Fathers form the majority of non-custodial parents who are delinquent in paying child
support, therefore, it understates the problem to discuss "parents," where the real problem is
fathers. One study revealed that fathers are more likely to pay their car loans regularly than
child support owed to mothers. In 1990, car loan delinquency was less than 3%, while 49% of
child support payments owed to mothers went unpaid. Paula Monopli, "DeadbeatDads":
Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 257, 258 (1994); (See
William Safire, What Fathers Want, NY TIMES, June 16, 1994, at A27.) Therefore, this
Comment, in general, refers to custodial parents as "mothers" and non-custodial parents who
are obligated to pay child support as "fathers." Although not all families on welfare are women
with children, nationally 89% are. Personal Responsibility Act, § 101, 110 Stat. at 2110
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. sec. 601 note (1997)).
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receive their rightful payments.5 Recent reforms in both the child support
enforcement program and the welfare system as a whole address the special
link between welfare rolls and delinquent child support payments. These

reforms should drastically increase the number of welfare families receiving
child support, and as a result decrease the welfare caseload.6

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996' (Personal Responsibility Act) was enacted to reform the currently
inefficient and costly national welfare system' by encouraging parents to take
financial responsibility for their families.' It also grants greater autonomy
and flexibility to all states in distributing welfare.1 In addition to these
benefits, however, there are problems. The Personal Responsibility Act

reduces overall federal funding for state welfare programs," and consequently, states are forced to spend more of their own money on programs no
longer covered by federal funding." The Personal Responsibility Act also
tightens welfare eligibility requirements. 3 Therefore, it will propel many
currently eligible families off the welfare rolls with no other source of

5. NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 3.
6. The addition of child support payments to a working single mother's small salary can
lead to a family's independence from government support. For example, if a mother of two
children works full time at $5.15 an hour and receives $240 a month for each of her children
from their father, she will receive $1,304 a month. In San Diego, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children [hereinafter AFDC] would pay that family only $594 a month. See Sabrena
Marshall, AFDC, GAIN and Child Support: Working Together to Promote Self-Sufficiency,
PARTNERS FOR SUCCESS (1996). A further advantage child support has over welfare is that
increased income, based on the receipt of child support payments, generally does not cause the
loss of MediCal or food stamp benefits. Interview with Sabrena Marshall, GAIN social worker,
San Diego (March 18, 1997). The average child support order for a welfare family is $240 per
child per month. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, Fact
Sheet [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. The amount per child, however, decreases based on the number
of children in the family that the father supports. See Cal. Family Code § 4055 (West 1994).
7. Personal Responsibility Act, 110 Stat. at 2105.
8. Personal Responsibility Act, § 101, 110 Stat. at 2110-12 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 601 note (1997)).
9. The federal government dedicated nearly one quarter of the Personal Responsibility Act
(62 pages of the 250 page act) to reforming the Child Support Enforcement Program. Personal
Responsibility Act, § 300-95, 110 Stat. at 2198-260.
10. Personal Responsibility Act, § 103, 110 Stat. at 2113 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 601, § 401(a) (1997)).
11. Federal Welfare Reform (H.R. 3734): FiscalEffect on California, Legislative Analyst's
Office (Aug. 20, 1996) <http://vww.lao.ca.gov/fedwelfare reform pb082096.html>
[hereinafter LAO Report].
12. Id.
13. The Personal Responsibility Act includes a mandatory work requirement for all
participants after two years of receiving benefits, as well as a five year lifetime benefit limit.
These provisions eliminate all financial assistance to ineligible families, unless child support
payments are enforced. One commentator fears that this bill, with all its benefits, may "make
hundreds of thousands of children poorer." 142 CONG. REc. E1570-01 (Sept. 11, 1996)
(Remarks by Hon. Lee Hamilton) available in 1996 WL 514072 [hereinafter Hamilton remarks].
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income. 4 The federal legislature recognized this deficiency, however, and

included provisions aimed at increasing collection rates in the state's Child

Support Enforcement Divisions (CSEDs). 5 The legislature reasoned that the
increased collections of child support payments should generate revenue to
offset additional state welfare costs and help families avoid welfare by

becoming financially stable. 6

Arguably, the enforcement of child support payments has always been the
best method to supplement state welfare costs. 7 However, burdensome and
time-consuming federal procedural requirements formerly limited each CSED

caseworker's potential for productivity."

Conservative national statistics

estimate that one-half to three-quarters of all potential child support payments
went uncollected under a former "auditing" system which reviewed trivial

procedures, such as when and how to mail letters, rather than the amount of
child support being collected.

9

Under the Personal Responsibility Act, this

14. There are many more, equally problematic areas of the Personal Responsibility Act,
but federal funding and eligibility limitations are the two main problem areas upon which this
article focuses.
15. CSEDs are agencies, funded by both the state and federal governments, which work
cooperatively with social services to determine child paternity, obtain court orders for child
support, and enforce child support payments. The agencies serve both welfare and non-welfare
families. NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.
16. The 1994 census reported that there has been a 319% increase in female-headed single
parent households since 1960. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Marital Status and Living
Arrangements, CURRENT POP. REPORT, Series P20-484 (March 1994 and earlier reports).

While 50% of female-headed, single parent families received child support orders, as of 1992,
33% of the $17.7 billion due in child support payments went unpaid. Further, child support
payments, on average, account for 17 % of a female-headed, single parent family's income. Who
Receives Child Support?, U.S. Bureau of the Census (May 1995)
<http://www.census.gov/pub/sodemo/www/chldsupp.html>. One criticism of this reasoning
is that financial stability is based on the assumption that child support payments would arrive on
time and in full every month, without fail. However, the legislature's reasoning does not fail
completely because there would still be a significant improvement over the meager 12.5% of
welfare families that currently receive payments if only half of the families with non-indigent
fathers made regular payments. Studies show that at least 60% of the fathers of welfare families
are employed at wages above the poverty level and could afford to pay all or part of their child
support order regularly. See infra note 146.
17. H.R. Report No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1992). This is not to say that child
support enforcement is the only manner by which to supplement state welfare costs.
Commentators have also advocated a similar system which aids needy families using tax dollars,
instead of enforcing child support, in order to save the costs of finding delinquent paying fathers.
Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, 166,
1990) (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay, eds.); Stephen D. Sugarman, Financial
Support of Children and the End to Welfare as We Know It, 81 VA. L. REV. 2523 (1995).
18. One state agency study revealed that each CSED caseworker managed approximately
one thousand child support enforcement cases. This leaves eight minutes per case, per month
for that caseworker to spend on each. One commentator has noted that this is "barely enough
time to find and open a file." Remarks Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 2, 1995) (statement of Roberta
Spalter-Roth, Director of Research Institute for Women's Policy Research) available in WL
6621234 [hereinafter Spalter-Roth statement].
19. Nationally, $8.9 billion in child support is collected, but conservative estimates claim
$20-40 billion goes uncollected. Child Support Enforcement: Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Federal Services of the Governmental Affairs Committee, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (July
20,1994) (testimony of Judy Jones Jordon) available in WL 14190261 [hereinafter Jones Jordan
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strict procedural scrutiny has been eliminated and replaced with a system
monitoring child support collection results. Less procedural scrutiny should
reduce time spent pacifying federal spending guidelines and provide CSEDs

with more time to spend enforcing child support orders.
California, the largest welfare state,2" has the largest child support
enforcement caseload.2 1 For California, the Personal Responsibility Act
couples new state autonomy with the loss of nearly $6.8 billion in federal

welfare funding over the next six years.2 This is extremely problematic for
California, given the fact that the Federal Office of Child Support Enforce-

ment gave California's child support enforcement program an overall grade
of "D" in a 1991 report.' Although California has produced the most
significant overall increase in productivity in the last five years than any other
state with similar demographics,24 California's child support collection rate
for welfare mothers was still 3.5 % below the national average in 1994.25
However, if the Personal Responsibility Act succeeds in making the CSED
more efficient, states, such as California, might be able to increase their child
support collections, decrease their welfare costs, and help welfare families
become independent, all at the same time.26

The Personal Responsibility Act contains the most radical reforms in the
nation's welfare history, but the precise ramifications of these changes remain

testimony].
20. California's welfare caseload totaled 2.6 million recipients as of November 1996.
Robert Pear, Welfare Changes Minor Under U.S. Rule, THE PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 6, 1996, at
18A.
21. In 1994, California's child support caseload was at 2.1 million. CAL. DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS & CAL. FAMILY SUPPORT COUNCIL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT INCALIFORNIA (1995) at iii [hereinafter FUTURE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT]. As
of November 1996, $3.5 billion was owed in unpaid child support in California. Nancy Weaver

Teichert, Kids Often Cut on JaggedEdges as MarriagesBreak Apart, THE SACRAMENTO BEE,
Nov. 18, 1996, at Al.

22. LAO Report, supra note 11.
23. California has worked to "debunk the myth" that California's child support enforcement

program is not productive by demonstrating that the report was defective because it assessed

productivity using unreliable points of comparison between states. FUTURE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, at 10. For example, commentators argue that the report should
have compared how costs and'results related instead of comparing trivial procedural compliance
as it did. Id. at 11.
24. Id. at 11.
25. As mentioned, 12.5% of child support payments were collected for welfare families
nationally in 1994. NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 39. In 1994, California
generated support for only 9% of its welfare families. The 9% figure is derived from the
following information: In California, 1,449,243 AFDC families were owed child support, the
average child support monthly payment was $240 in 1994, Fact Sheet, supra note 6, and the
total support payments collected for the AFDC families was $373,001,980 in 1994, CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT ON CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
(1995) at 14 [hereinafter 1995 ANNUAL REPORT].
26. These projections for California are dependent on a number of factors, such as whether
California decides to make up for the lost federal funds and whether California declines to aid
all those made ineligible under the Personal Responsibility Act. There are also unknown costs
for the Peisonal Responsibility Act's reform implementation. LAO Report, supra note 11.
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unknown." This Comment focuses on the changes the enforcement of child
support and how these changes should help to offset new state welfare
costs.2"

Section I of this Comment explores the Personal Responsibility Act's
welfare reforms which terminate support for many needy families. Some of

the more damaging provisions of the act include new eligibility limitations,

block grants,29 and the conditioning of federal funding on state productivity.
Section II discusses the history of child support enforcement and the
revolutionary changes made by the Personal Responsibility Act. This section

demonstrates how the Personal ResponsibilityAct's child support enforcement
provisions should help to offset the costs and solve the dilemmas the recent

welfare reforms create. Section I illustrates some criticisms of the Personal
Responsibility Act's reforms and proposes some possible solutions. Section

IV lays out suggestions for constructing child support assurance legislation.
Such legislation could prove critical to the financial independence and

stability of many welfare families headed by single women. In conclusion,
the Personal Responsibility Act may be the "end to welfare as we know it,"

but it is a viable reform mainly because the Personal Responsibility Act
grants CSEDs the means to force fathers to pay child support and help many
welfare families move beyond the need for welfare altogether.
I. THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT'S WELFARE REFORMS
The Personal Responsibility Act implements many revolutionary, yet
controversial, new reforms which have made our old welfare system obsolete.
The Personal Responsibility Act eliminates Aid to Families with Dependent

Children30 (AFDC) and replaces31 it with Temporary Assistance to Needy

27. Hamilton remarks, supra note 13.
28. For every $1 invested in child support enforcement programs, $4 is collected.
NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 45. Therefore, when CSEDs collect payments
for welfare families, this reduces families welfare needs and overall state costs. Spalter-Roth
statement, supra note 18.
29. A block grant consists of one large sum of money for the state to distribute. Interview
with Carol Drummond, Communications Coordinator, San Diego Dept. of Social Services
(October 8, 1996) [hereinafter Drummond interview].
30. The federal welfare system (which later developed into AFDC) began in 1911 as a
state-level pension designed to help the poor children of women without husbands, generally
widows. It allowed them the opportunity to raise their children at home, in the hope that
mothers would stimulate a universal cultural family ideal and ensure the "assimilation of proper
family values" in children. Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in HistoricalPerspective, 26
CONN. L. REv. 879 (1994) (as developed in GWENDOLYN MINK, THE WAGES OF MOTHERHOOD:
WOMEN'S INEQUALITY INTHE WELFARE STATE (1995)).
31. Under the Personal Responsibility Act, AFDC entitlement ended on Oct. 1, 1996. LAO
Report, supra note 11.
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Families32 (TANF). TANF increases state autonomy by letting states
determine fund distribution and family eligibility standards."
However,
TANF eligibility limitations, block grants and the conditioning of federal
funding on productivity all necessitate a new way to generate state revenue
to help families in need.34
Eligibility limitations under the Personal Responsibility Act pose serious
financial problems to families on welfare. Under the Personal Responsibility
Act, there is a two-year mandatory work requirement, and a five year lifetime
benefit limit.3" Once families exceed their eligibility limits, the state can
offer them no further government assistance.36 The first requirement
mandates that all welfare recipients obtain employment after two years of
benefits. " The second requirement is stricter and terminates all welfare
benefits to recipients after five years, regardless of financial need.3"
However, there are exceptions. If a recipient was under 18, or not recognized
as the head of the household for a time while collecting TANF, the Personal
Responsibility Act does not include these months in the five year limit.3 9
Further, each state may allow 20% of recipients to extend their benefits for

32. TANF is'a program which provides needy families with temporary benefits while
promoting work and personal responsibility. Personal Responsibility Act, § 103(a), 110 Stat.
at 2113 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. sec. 601, § 401(a) (1997)). This is much different than
the former AFDC program because benefits are no longer viewed as an entitlement. Personal
Responsibility Act, § 103(a), 110 Stat. at 2113 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. sec. 601, §

401(b) (1997)).

33. Personal Responsibility Act, § 103, 110 Stat. at 2113 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. see. 601, § 401(a-b) (1997)).
34. The states are now responsible for generating any extra money they need if the federal
funding is insufficient. Hamilton remarks, supra note 13.
35. Benefit limitations are on the family use of federal block grant funds. LAO Report,
supra note 11. The propriety of benefit limitations is in debate because of differing statistics for
different groups of welfare recipients. Some group differences include age and race. For
example, some studies have found that older women have a greater probability of leaving the
welfare rolls than younger women. These studies disagree, however, as to their reasoning.
VICKY N. ALBERT, WELFARE DEPENDENCE AND WELFARE POLICY (1988), at 109 (citing R.
Plotnick, Turnover in the AFDC Population:An Event History Analysis, 18 J. HUM. RESOURCES
65-81 (1983), and R.M. Hutchins, Entry and Exit Transitionsin Government TransferPrograms:
The Case of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 16J. HUM. RESOURCES 217-37 (1981)).
With regard to race, studies have produced contradictory results as to when welfare dependence
ends. One study found that non-White families tend to stay on welfare longer than White
families. For high school graduates, under the age of 30, non-White families stay approximately
6.2 years, while White families stay 4.3 years. This study also suggested that marriage did not
aid in non-White families' welfare closure as much as job earnings. Id. at 109, (citing M.J.
Bane & D.T. Ellwood, The Dynamics of Dependence: The Routes to Self-Sufficiency, Contract
No HHS-100-82-0038 (Washington DC: U.S. Health and Human Services Department, 1983).
36. Personal Responsibility Act, § 103, 110 Stat. at 2137 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 608, § 408(a)(7)(A) (1997)).
37. Sherril Paul, Assistant Deputy Director, Program and Policy Development Division,
Country of San Diego Department of Social Services, Remarks at South Bay Human Services
FallForum (Oct. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Paul remarks].
38. Personal Responsibility Act, § 103, 110 Stat. at 2137 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 608, § 408(a)(7)(A) (1997)).
39. Personal Responsibility Act, § 103, 110 Stat. at 2137 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. see. 608, § 408 (a)(7)(B) (1997)).
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reasons of hardship, such as physical abuse.4" While time limits are meant
to encourage work and independence from welfare rolls, some families will
not become independent before their welfare eligibility expires.41 After
leaving welfare roles, many families will require another source of financial
assistance. Child support payments by the delinquent father could fill that

need.42
A financially problematic provision of the Personal Responsibility Act is
the federal government's use of annual block grants43 under the Personal
Responsibility Act." With block grants, proper distribution and longevity

of funds are a major concern among states.45 The advantage of block grants
is that the states will have greater flexibility in operating their welfare

programs and more opportunity to innovate on a state level.46 The disadvantage of this system, however, is that state financing will inevitably
increase due to the decrease in federal support.4 7 This potential for increased costs could encourage states to "cut comers" in distributing welfare

in order to manage the limited funds available.4"

Because these limited

federal funds cannot cover the cost of all currently available programs' costs,

states will have to finance any programs they do not down-size to meet

available funding.49 In California alone, overall federal welfare funding is
estimated to drop nearly $6.8 billion over the next six years." One critic

of block grants notes that distribution of these limited funds may become
problematic over the course of each year. The state's federal block grant may

40. Personal Responsibility Act, § 103, 110 Stat. at 2137 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 608, § 408 (a)(7)(C) (1997)).
41. While work requirements for welfare recipients is something most people support, this
will still be a problematic area for many families. In states where the unemployment rate is
10% or greater, welfare recipients are 7% less likely to work, in contrast to recipients who live
in states with an unemployment rate of 3.5% or less. Spalter-Roth statement, supra note 18.
This will make the two year work requirement more problematic in states where there is high
unemployment.
42. This is the very premise upon which the Personal Responsibility Act was formulated
- the promotion of parents taking personal responsibility for their children. Personal
Responsibility Act, § 101(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 2110-12.
43. See supra note 29.
44. Personal Responsibility Act, § 103, 110 Stat. at 2112-24.
45. Under the former system, the federal government paid 50% of all administrative and
benefit costs for each state's welfare caseload, rather than block grants. Drummond interview,
supra note 29.
46. Personal Responsibility Act, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 2113 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 601, § 401(a) (1997)).

47. Dion Nissenbaum, Welfare Cut Result Hazy, Wilson Says, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE,
Aug. 14, 1996, at A07.
48. As one editorial commented, the new block grants given to the states will be
unworkable because they will create a state to state "race to the bottom," as states race to cut
welfare benefits faster than their neighboring states in order to save state funds. Paul Peterson,
State Response to Welfare Reform: A Race to the Bottom?, Welfare Reform: An Analysis of the
Issues (visited Sept. 26, 1996) <http://www.apwa.org/statenew/CA.htm>.
49. Id.
50. LAO Report, supra note 11.
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diminish towards the end of the year, so many families who become eligible
at that point may be denied assistance.'
In addition to creating block grants, the Personal Responsibility Act,
conditions a state's receipt of federal funds on state productivity. The federal

government now requires that each state have 25% of the heads of TANF
households employed by 1997, and 50% by 2002.52 Further, while TANF

annual payments under the grants are larger than the former payments under
AFDC, other welfare programs, such as the food stamp program, were

significantly cut.53 Therefore, based on the possibility of further sanctions
and an overall decrease in federal funding, states need to find additional

methods to financially support their programs. Sanction opponents argue that
the Personal Responsibility Act's financial impact on states will be even more

severe given the new system of penalties. The federal government will
sanction poorer states which are unable to meet participant work requirements. 4 Opponents argue that the poorer states will face an even harder
battle the next year as they attempt to improve their program with less
funding.55 Therefore, federal sanctions may actually assure repeated
violations and continued decreases56 in funding for poorer states because of the

continued series of funding cuts.
While the Personal Responsibility Act's provisions may be damaging to
many needy families, its purpose is to encourage states to help move families
beyond the need for welfare, toward work, and eventually toward decreasing
future welfare rolls.5 7 The goal is to decrease overall welfare costs through

the promotion of personal responsibility.58

There are even financial

incentives for states that actually meet these goals. 59 The provisions in the
Personal Responsibility Act for reforming child support enforcement should
aid both state and family burdens. The Personal Responsibility Act's

51. Rebecca Blumenstein, et al., Welfare: Q&A. Sidebars, availablein 1995 WL 5102609.
52. Personal Responsibility Act, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 2129 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 607, § 407(a) (1997)). In San Diego county, 27% of welfare participants are
employed. Nada Grigsby, Program Manager, S. Bay Employment Services, Country of San
Diego Department of Social Services, Remarks at the South Bay Hwnan Services Fall Forum
(Oct. 25, 1996). In determining funding sanctions, however, California will be judged
according to the state's total percentage of working participants-not county by county. States
could lose up to 5% of their block grant if they do not meet these work requirements. This
penalty increases 2% each year, up to 21%, if non-compliance continues. LAO Report, supra
note 11.
53. LAO Report, supra note 11.
54. 142 CONG. REc. S8929, S8930 (July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bingaman)
[hereinafter Bingaman statement].
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Personal Responsibility Act, § 103, 110 Stat. at 2113 (codified as amended in 42
U.S.C. 601 (1997)).
58. Personal Responsibility Act, § 101(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 2110-12.
59. For example, states demonstrating a significant decrease in out-of-wedlock births could
gain a bonus of up to $25 million. Personal Responsibility Act, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 2118
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. sec. 603, § 403(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1997)).
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emphasis on child support enforcement demonstrates the federal government's
reliance on child support collections in supplementing state costs under the
Personal Responsibility Act's reforms. 60 This reliance should serve as "our
best opportunity to change the culture of welfare and... to provide in every
way possible a hand up ...not a handout."6'
I. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT

Child support enforcement is the mechanism that makes'the Personal
Responsibility Act's welfare reforms a viable means to revolutionize welfare

distribution.62 Before discussing the history of child support enforcement

or the Personal Responsibility Act's reforms, it is important to describe

briefly how CSEDs help to offset welfare costs.
Each county runs a CSED which collects monthly child support payments

from fathers and establishes paternity in order to generate support obligations
for both welfare and non-welfare families.

Once a family enrolls in the

welfare program, Social Services automatically enrolls them in the child
support enforcement program regardless of whether they have a child support

order or payments that are delinquent.63 While the family is on welfare, the
father pays all child support payments directly to the state and the state uses
the funds to offset the costs of welfare payments to the family.64 Formerly,
the state gave the first $50 of collected child support, termed the "disregard,"

to the family in addition to their monthly welfare check.65 The state
retained the balance as reimbursement for previously-paid state welfare

benefits, but not for collection costs.66 The Personal Responsibility Act has
eliminated this $50 disregard,67 thus creating another means to generate state
revenue.

60. See supra note 9.
61. 142 CONG. REC. S9322-02 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
62. One supporter referred to the Personal Responsibility Act's child support enforcement
reforms as "the silver lining" of the welfare reform bill. 142 CONG. REC. S9322-02 (daily ed.
Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bradley).
63. Personal Responsibility Act, § 301(a), 110 Stat. at 2199 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. see. 654, § 454(4)(A) (1997)).
64. Personal Responsibility Act, § 302(a), 110 Stat. at 2200 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. see. 657, § 457(a)(1) (1997)).
65. 42 U.S.C. see. 657(b) (1996).
66. Personal Responsibility Act, § 301, 110 Stat. at 2201 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 654, § 457(a)(1) (1997)). CSEDs continue to collect delinquent child support
payments after a family leaves welfare. Delinquent child support payments, which should have
been made to the family while the family was on welfare, are paid to the state to reimburse it
for welfare payments paid to that family during that period. Personal Responsibility Act, § 301,
110 Stat. at 2202 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. sec. 654, § 457(a)(1)(B)(ii)(bb) (1997)).
67. LAO Report, supra note 11. For example, an AFDC family, which had its child
support payments enforced by a CSED, would receive their monthly benefits, plus an extra $50
from the support payments. Under the current system, if a family is receiving TANF and a
CSED enforces its child support order, the entire payment is paid to the state and the family
continues to receive only TANF benefits.
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While many families have benefited from CSEDs' services by receiving
child support payments from fathers who formerly refused to pay, the fact
remains that under the old collection system, twice as many families did
not.6" In analyzing CSEDs' past inefficiencies, the primary deficiencies
were procedural barriers and the limited means available for CSEDs to
sanction non-paying fathers. The Personal Responsibility Act cures both
these deficiencies, thereby increasing the potential for CSEDs to be more
productive.
A. The History of ChildSupport Enforcement

Child support enforcement has been an available method to offset welfare
costs since welfare first began in 1911.69 Before 1971, the welfare department dealt with child support enforcement issues on its own.7" Since 1971,
however, CSEDs7" have handled child support enforcement and Social
Services has automatically referred all households headed by a single parent
to them for paternity establishment and child support enforcement.72
Before 1975, state law governed all child support enforcement
programs." As a result, there was no uniformity in distribution, eligibility
requirements, or the setting of support awards. The state run programs
were not very efficient or productive, and enforcing awards in a different
state was virtually impossible.75 To remedy some of these program
deficiencies, the Child Support Enforcement Act of 1974 created the first
federally mandated, state-run, child support enforcement program. 76 Its
goals were to: (1) reduce welfare costs, (2) increase parent contribution, and
(3) secure independence for welfare families by using child support
enforcement programs to get them off the welfare rolls. 7
Congress has attempted to reform the welfare and child support enforcement system for the last twenty years. The provisions of the 1974 Act were

68. Nationally, $8.9 billion in child support is collected annually and the conservative
estimates speculate that $20-40 billion goes uncollected. Jones Jordon testimony, supra note 19.
69. FUTURE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, at 1.
70. Id.
71. In California, all CSEDs are separate divisions within the 58 state district attorney's
Offices. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM: VISION FOR EXCELLENCE, at 1 (June 1992).
72. FUTURE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 21, at 1.

73. Paula Roberts, Child Support Enforcement and Assurance: One Partof an Anti-Poverty
Strategyfor-Women, 21 SOC. JUST. 76, 77 (1994).

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. The Child Support Enforcement Act of 1974 is located in Title IV, Part D of the Social
Security Act. 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 523, 525 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. see. 651-69 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1992)).
77. H.R. Report No. 771, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1992).
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amended in 1984 and 1988," 8 along with minor reform legislation passed in
1992 and 1993.
Most reforms were attempts to increase enforcement
uniformity and standardize administrative collection procedures.80 Past

federal reforms have conditioned benefit eligibility on a mother's cooperation
in paternity establishment,"' and permitted reviews and modifications of past
child support orders.82 They have also improved delinquent child support

collection methods by garnishing wages,

tracking down fathers using

employment information, 84 and enacting laws which make willful failure to
pay child support a felony.85

While many reforms have changed federally funded child support
enforcement in the years since 1975, the most radical changes in child
support enforcement and welfare as a whole occurred with the passage of the
Personal Responsibility Act.86 The current dilemma facing the CSEDs is

interpreting and integrating all the new changes into their programs.8 7 Once

states implement the Personal Responsibility Act's provisions, however, the

reforms should offset welfare rolls significantly, encourage more work

participation, and provide the long-awaited "end to welfare as we know it."88
The Personal Responsibility Act focuses on the benefits of increased child

78. David L. Chambers, Fathers, The Welfare System, and the Virtues and Perilsof Child
Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2584 (1995) (citing Child Support Enforcement
Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 1305; Family
Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 2343).
79. Id. (citing Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102 -521, 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 3403; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103 66, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 213).
80. Roberts, supra note 73, at 77. Prior to creating administrative processes and child
support award guidelines, judges had a lot of discretion as to how much to award. Id.
81. Chambers, supra note 78, at 2584 (citing 42 U.S.C. see. 602(a)(26)(B)(1988)).
82. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. sec. 667(a); sec. 667(b)(2); sec. 666(a)(10) (1988)). These
modifications are based on increases in child care costs and changes in the non-custodial parent's
income.
83. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. see. 666(a)(8) (1988 & Supp. V 1994)).
84. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. sec. 653 (1988) ("Parent Locator Services")).
85. Id. at 2584 (citing 18 U.S.C. sec. 228 (1994)).
86. While the Personal Responsibility Act is the most radical welfare reform to date, prior
to its passage, the most significant welfare reform act was the Family Support Act of 1988
[hereinafter FSA]. Like the Personal Responsibility Act, the FSA also encouraged selfsufficiency. One billion dollars was appropriated under this act to re-train, educate, and assist
with child care costs. Mink, Welfare Reform, supranote 30, at 892. Two major problems with
the FSA program were that child care provisions did not work properly and the women were
trained for low-wage, unstable jobs which provided little financial help or job security. Id.
(citing Julie Johnson, Child Care Lack Dims Welfare Programs Future, NY TIMES, Dec. 12,
1989, at A20). The FSA encouraged women to work, but did not consider the fact that the work
available to these women was the reason these women remained poor. The minimum sufficiency
wage as of 1991 was $6.67 per hour. Almost one half of the women under this act earned less
than this minimum standard. Id. (citing HEIDI HARTMAN & ROBERTA SPALTER-ROTH,
INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, THE LABOR MARKET, THE WORKING POOR, AND
THE WELFARE REFORM: POLICY SUGGESTIONS FOR THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION (1992)).

87. Drummond interview, supra note 29.
88. Hamilton remarks, supra note 13.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1996

11

California Western Law Review, Vol. 33 [1996], No. 2, Art. 12
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

support enforcement collections, thus making a great deal of this success
possible.
B. The PersonalResponsibilityAct's ChildSupport Enforcement Reforms
The Personal Responsibility Act cuts welfare eligibility and federal

funding to save costs. These cuts could push many families off the welfare
rolls with no source of income. 9 Therefore, child support enforcement

becomes critical because it can supply financial independence to families

ineligible for welfare.9" Nationally, 87.5% 1 of welfare families headed by
single parents do not receive child support, so logically many of these
families should be able to leave the welfare rolls and live independently if

they receive monthly child support payments.92 Further, under the Personal
Responsibility Act, not only is child support enforcement encouraged but it
is mandatory for any state that wants federal funding for its welfare
programs.9"

The Personal Responsibility Act's.welfare reforms and child

support enforcement are more efficient and successful because of nationwide
innovations and changes in computerization, sanctions for delinquent fathers,
paternity establishment regulations, and the federal auditing procedures. One
commentator has noted that under the Personal Responsibility Act, CSEDs
finally have "real teeth" with which to extract payment or enact penalties on
fathers who do not pay.94
1. Computerization

The reforms of the Personal Responsibility Act focus a great deal of

attention on computerizing CSED offices statewide and nationwide.95 The

89. The impact of ineligibility is mainly a concern because of the new five year lifetime
benefit limit. For California, the benefit timer may have begun to tick as early as Oct. 1, 1996,
when AFDC benefits ended, but the California Social Services Department is not yet certain
what the day will be. Paul remarks, supra note 37. When these families are ineligible after
their five years has expired, they will need other sources of income, such as child support, to
live independently.
90. Chambers, supra note 78, at 2585.
91. See supra note 3.
92. NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
93. Federal certification is required to prove state's use of a child support enforcement
program. Personal Responsibility Act, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 2114 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. sec. 602, § 402(a)(2) (1997)).
94. 142 CONG. REc. E1453-02, E1453 (July 31, 1996) (Speech by Hon. Constance A.
Morella).

95. Even prior to the Personal Responsibility Act, computerization has advanced child
support enforcement techniques and efficiency. For example, once a CSED discovers where a
father who owes child support is employed, the CSED then notifies the employer to garnish the
employees wages. Computerization allows the San Diego CSED to notify employers automatically by computer, without staff assistance. Jeff Weeland, Deputy District Attorney, Chief of
Legal Division, Bureau of Child Support Enforcement, Dept. of the District Attorney, Remarks
at the South Bay Human Services FallForum (Oct. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Weeland remarks].
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computerization provisions are initially a costly endeavor, the goal behind
these provisions is to increase efficiency. 96 Computerization will greatly
assist in locating out-of-state fathers. As of 1995, 30% of child support
enforcement cases involved fathers who lived out of state, yet CSEDs
nationally collected only 7% of these payments due. In the past, it has
been difficult to keep track of fathers because many move to other states to
avoid complying with child support orders.98 In response to this problem,
the Personal Responsibility Act mandates the expansion of the "Parent
Locator Service," which is a nation-wide computer network that aids in
tracking fathers as they move from state to state.99 Similarly, locating fathers
with delinquent support within states will also be easier after computerization
because the Personal Responsibility Act also implements a "State Case
Registry" to network all CSEDs' computers. 00
In addition to "parent locators," the Personal Responsibility Act also
includes a "State Directory of New Hires."10' Under the Personal Responsibility Act, employers must report all new hires to state child support
enforcement agencies within twenty days of hire, so money can be withheld
from an employee's paycheck if the employee is delinquent in making his
child support payments.0 2
Non-compliant employers will face penalties.'0 3
2. Sanctions
In addition to computerized access to information, the Personal Responsibility Act also provides CSEDs with strong tools with which to collect
support payments. Methods of enforcement now include uniform interstate

96. The procedural regulations which proved time-consuming to monitor on paper, have
created even more hardships in their implementation into a computerized system. Before the

Personal Responsibility Act, nearly $2 billion had already been spent on a national system of

computers by 1994, and much of the money was spent to appease procedural regulations rather
than increase child support enforcement efficiency. Implementing Welfare Revision, Hearings

Before the Subcommittee on Human Resources of the House of Representatives Committee on
Ways and Means, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 19, 1996) (testimony by Robert M. Melia),
available in 1996 WL 10831249 [hereinafter Melia testimony].
97. Spalter-Roth statement, supra note 18. While computerization is an important
improvement, there are still personal jurisdiction problems that the CSEDs face when attempting
to enforce child support payments from fathers who have moved out of state.
98. Spalter-Roth statement, supra note 18.

99. Personal Responsibility Act, § 316, 110 Stat. at 2214.
100. Personal Responsibility Act, § 311, 110 Stat. at 2205-06.
101. Personal Responsibility Act, § 313, 110 Stat. at 2209-12.
102. Personal Responsibility Act, § 313(b), 110 Stat. at 2210 (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. sec. 653a, § 453(A)(b)(2)(A) (1997)).

103. The penalty against the employer is set by the state. The penalty must be less than
$25, unless the state implements a law making failure to comply a conspiracy between employer
and employee. In the latter situation, the pdnalty must be less than $500. Personal Responsibility Act, § 313(b), 110 Stat. at 2211 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. see. 653a, § 453(A)(d)

(1997)).
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child support laws,' °4 the garnishment of wages,' 0 5 the seizure of

assets, °6 and the revocation of driver's, professional, and occupational
licenses. 0 7 Although all these methods are not new to child support
enforcement, the Personal Responsibility Act's inventory of strict methods
should provide an effective arsenal for CSEDs. In addition, some of the
newer reforms should be successful based on their prior successes in state test
programs. California, for example, enacted legislation which permitted
license revocation in 1992. Since then, the state has revoked more than
27,000 state-issued business and professional licenses.'
Limits on license
renewals or initial applications have proven to be a powerful tool in inspiring
compliance with child support orders. California has generated over $14
million through this procedure alone. 9
3. Paternity
One of the more controversial new provisions of the Personal Responsibility Act conditions welfare eligibility on the mother's cooperation in
determining a child's paternity."0 If the mother is unsure of her child's
paternity, she must cooperate in good faith with the CSED and provide all
necessary information to aid in establishing paternity."' Part of the
104. Personal Responsibility Act, § 321, 110 Stat. at 2221 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 666, § 466(t) (1997)).
105. Personal Responsibility Act, § 314, 110 Stat. at 2213 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 666(a)(1), § 466(a)(1) (1997)).
106. Personal Responsibility Act, § 325(c)(1)(G) , 110 Stat. at 2225 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. see. 666, § 466 (1997), as amended by § 314 of this act).
107. Personal Responsibility Act, § 369, 110 Stat. at 2251 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 666(a), § 466(a)(16) (1997)).
108. 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 4.
109. Id.
110. Personal Responsibility Act, § 333, 110 Stat. at 2230-31 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 654, § 454(3) (1997), as amended by § 301(b), § 303(a), and § 313(a) of this act).
111. Personal Responsibility Act, § 333, 110 Stat. at 2230-31 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 654, § 454(3) (1997), as amended by § 301(b), § 303(a), and § 313(a) of this act).
One of the largest criticisms of this reform is that there is no codified exception for women who
have suffered from domestic abuse. The Personal Responsibility Act states:
[he State agency responsible for administering the State plan- (A) shall make the
determination (and redetermination at appropriate intervals) as to whether an
individual who has applied for or is receiving assistance under the State program... is cooperating in good faith with the State in establishing the paternity of,
or in establishing, modifying, or enforcing a support order for, any child of the
individual by providing the State agency with the name of, and such other information as the State agency may require with respect to, the noncustodial parent of the
child, subject to good cause and other exceptions which- (i) shall be defined, taking
into account the best interests of the child, and (ii) shall be applied in each case, by,
at the option of the State, the State agency administering the State program.
Personal Responsibility Act, § 333, 110 Stat. at 2230-31 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. see.
654, § 454(29)(A) (1997), as amended by § 301(b), § 303(a), and § 313(a) of this act))
(emphasis added). Under this reform, the state has the discretion to force abused women to
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mandatory cooperation requirement can require the mother to appear at
interviews, hearings, and legal proceedings, as well as submit herself and her

child to genetic tests, pursuant to an administrative or judicial order."'
Mothers who fail to cooperate with paternity establishment face a minimum
25% reduction in their monthly assistance payments. 13 The state welfare
system could deny assistance to an otherwise eligible family altogether if the
mother does not provide the requisite information.'
The purpose behind

these provisions is to encourage more welfare mothers to voluntarily offer
paternity, thus making delinquent child support payments that much easier to
enforce. 15
4. FederalAudits

In addition to adding new sanctions for non-paying fathers, the Personal
Responsibility Act also de-emphasizes the procedural audit, which is an

ineffective and time-consuming process." 6

Every three years,

17

the

General Accounting Office (GAO) audits agency procedures by reviewing the
"adequacy of financial management of the State [child support enforcement]
program."'1 Procedural audits assess whether child support collections are
properly distributed, 1 9 and whether state funds are "appropriately expended,
and.. : properly and fully accounted for."'20 While the Personal Responsi-

comply with paternity establishment and face the possibility of future abuse in order to continue
to receive their welfare benefits.
112. Personal Responsibility Act, § 333, 110 Stat. at 2231 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. see. 654, § 454(29)(B-C) (1997), as amended by § 301(b), § 303(a), and § 313(a) of this
act).
113. Personal Responsibility Act, § 103, 110 Stat. at 2135 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. see. 608, § 408(a)(2)(A) (1997)).
114. Chambers, supra note 78, at 2586.
115. Personal Responsibility Act, § 331(a), 110 Stat. at 2227 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 666(a)(5), §466(a)(5) (1997)).
116. Many commentators directly involved in the audit process have advocated deemphasizing the procedural audit because it does not increase productivity. Statement Before
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 104th Congress, 1st Sess., (March 28, 1995) (prepared
statement of Margaret Campbell Haynes, Former Chair, US Commission on Interstate Child
Support American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law) 1995 WL 10887406; Jones
Jordan testimony, supra note 19.
117. Personal Responsibility Act, § 342, 110 Stat. at 2234 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 652(a)(4), § 452(a)(4)(C)(i) (1997)). More frequent audits are done when a CSED
fails to meet procedural standards. Id.
118. Personal Responsibility Act, § 342, 110 Stat. at 2234 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 652(a)(4), § 452(a)(4)(C)(ii) (1997)).
119. Personal Responsibility Act, § 342, 110 Stat. at 2234 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 652(a)(4), § 452(a)(4)(C)(ii)(I1) (1997)).
120. Personal Responsibility Act, § 342, 110 Stat. at 2234 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 652(a)(4), § 452(a)(4)(C)(ii)() (1997)).
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bility Act has not eliminated procedural audits entirely,' it has shifted the
emphasis away from procedure and focused primarily on productivity.'

Prior to the Personal Responsibility Act's passage, triennial audits reviewed federally mandated procedures only.'

The audits were so techni-

cally burdensome that 70% of the states failed at least one of the reviewed
categories the first time.'24 The time-consuming guidelines forced CSEDs
to lose a great deal of productivity potential,"

because the audits forced

states to comply with trivial procedures in order to keep federal funding
rather than work to increase child support collection rates. 6 The procedural auditing process was also burdensome for the Federal Office of Child
Support Enforcement,'2 7 (Federal OCSE) which was forced to dedicate 50%
of its staff resources to conducting state CSED procedural audits.' The

largest complaint regarding the time-consuming procedural audit was the fact
that it did not improve the overall productivity of child support enforcement.'29 States which learned how to pass the audits spent too much
valuable time preparing for the audit, rather than working to increase
collections. 3 ' Since the passage of the Personal Responsibility Act, staff
members can spend more time establishing child paternity and collecting
delinquent child support payments.
The only purpose of the procedural audit was to verify that federal

money was spent according to guidelines.'
In effect, the audit traced all
the money the CSEDs spent to legitimate purposes, regardless of any derived
successes. The former, inefficient program also determined incentive
payments solely on procedural compliance rather than performance, thereby

rewarding inefficient programs.'32 For example, Indiana, which earned the
121. Procedural compliance is still audited every three years. Personal Responsibility Act,
§ 342, 110 Stat. at 2233-34 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. sec. 654, § 454 (1997)).
122. Personal Responsibility Act, § 341, 110 Stat. at 2231-33 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 658, § 458 (1997)).
123. Jones Jordon testimony, supra note 19.
124. Id.
125. The regulations reviewed by the audit include trivial tasks such as: when to open and
close cases, how many letters and notices to send by mail, what their content must be, how to
mail them, and when to mail them. Melia testimony, supra note 96.
126. Non-compliance with federal procedural regulations is penalized with reduced federal
funding. The first year a state is non-compliant, the penalty is 1%. For California, a 1%
penalty is approximately $40 million. FUTURE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note

21, at 4.
127. The Office of Child Support Enforcement is the federal agency which oversees the
state CSEDs and sets national standards. NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.

128. Jones Jordon testimony, supra note 19.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132.onImplementing
Welfare
Revision:
the Subcomm.
on Human
Comm.
Ways and Means
of the
House Testimony
Comm. on Before
Child Support
Provisions
of P.L.Resources
104-193:
The PersonalResponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 104th Cong.,

1st Sess. (Sept. 19, 1996) (testimony of Elisabeth Hirschhor Donahue) available in 1996 WL
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highest rating for effective use of federal funds in 1994, had the second
lowest child support collection rate in the nation.' 33
The federal government still needs to monitor spending through
procedural audits because it continues to reimburses states for 66% of their
collection costs. 13 4 However, while triennial procedural audits are necessary, the Personal Responsibility Act does not make procedure the sole focus
of the review.' 35 Therefore, the Personal Responsibility Act follows commentator advice by simplifying procedural audits 3 6 and changing welfare
distribution policy goals.' 37 Instead of unlimited lifetime support, the
Personal Responsibility Act's goals are to wean families off TANF and
promote TANF avoidance entirely. 3 While past procedural audits worked
as a system of state cost-reimbursement, the Personal Responsibility Act
properly turns the focus to productivity and results.'3 9
Since the Personal Responsibility Act is relatively new, the Federal
OCSE has not yet determined to what extent the new audits will concentrate
on substance over procedure. 140 Advocates of audits which measure results
argue that reviews should measure CSEDs' successes in: (1) paternity
establishment, (2) child support order establishment, (3) collections of current
support, (4) collections of overdue support payments, (5) enrollment of
children in parent's health insurance, and (6) distribution of collections. 4 '
Other advocates argue that it should only measure the percentage of
paternities established and the amount of child support collected.'
Reviewing productivity is intended to provide a stimulus for innovation on
a state level since funds are dependent
on results and procedure, rather than
4
careful procedural spending alone.

13104266 [hereinafter Donahue testimony].
133. Id.
134. Melia testimony, supra note 96. Unlike TANF, there are no limited block grants for
child support enforcement, so the flexible nature of funding requires that the federal government
monitor state spending.
135. Personal Responsibility Act, § 341, 110 Stat. at 2231-33 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 658, § 458 (1997)).
136. Jones Jordon testimony, supra note 19.
137. Hamilton remarks, supranote 13.
138. The main goal of the Personal Responsibility Act is to promote family self-sufficiency.
Personal Responsibility Act, § 101(10), 110 Stat. at 2112.
139. Melia testimony, supra note 96.
140. Telephone Interview with Keith Bassett, Director, OCSE's Audit Division (Nov. 1,

1996).
141. Jones Jordon testimony, supra note 19.
142. Melia testimony, supra note 96.
143. One procedural audit opponent argues that procedural audits should be eliminated
entirely and all funds should be dependent on results in order to stimulate innovation. Id.
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The productivity review process eventually should be the most efficient
and liberating new reform of the Personal Responsibility Act. 144 To further

aid productivity, the Personal Responsibility Act's mandatory national and
state-wide computer networks will simplify and standardize procedural and

productivity calculations in each locality. 4 Therefore, not only will overall

CSED productivity increase because of readily accessible information, but
more time can be spent innovating and securing orders because staff can
focus on results.
The Personal Responsibility Act grants the CSEDs new tools with which
to collect delinquent child support payments more efficiently.146 Some of

these reforms include national computerization, tougher sanctions, stringent
paternity establishment measures, and the de-emphasis of procedural audits.
These changes should make the CSEDs more productive and provide a means

for the Personal Responsibility Act's reforms to benefit both welfare families
and the states.
Im. CRITICISMS OF THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

AcT

There is a great deal of national support for the new reforms under the

Personal Responsibility Act.' 47 As with any new system, however, there
are problems. Because of the Personal Responsibility Act's recent passage,

provisions in the Personal Responsibility Act have yet to be fully implemented. While the productivity of the CSEDs should increase once the Personal
Responsibility Act reforms are in full effect, assuredly even more criticisms
will arise.

One criticism of the Personal Responsibility Act stems from the fact that
many families not receiving child support have poor fathers.' 48 Although
some poor fathers are currently able to pay only a portion of their child
support orders, critics argue that all support may be cut off when enforcement

tactics pressure fathers to make full payments. "4 Some fathers may enter

144. Before the Personal Responsibility Act's reforms, state CSEDs focused on passing
federal audits and avoiding sanctions, rather than innovating methods of collecting child support.
Jones Jordon testimony, supra note 19.
145. Personal Responsibility Act, § 344, 110 Stat. at 2234-36 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. sec. 654(16), § 454(16) (1997)).
146. Donahue testimony, supra note 132.
147. While little is known about the actual effect of the Personal Responsibility Act on
welfare and child support enforcement, Federal OCSE Deputy Director David Gray Ross has
said he is "[looking] forward to [the OCSE's] new responsibilities and [believes] that the next
several years will be an exciting and productive time for [the OCSE] and for the nation's child
support enforcement program."
OCSC Newsletter (October,
1996)
<http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/ACFPrograms/CSE/new/csr/9610.html >.
148. A 1995 survey revealed that 23.4% of parents not paying child support are
unemployed and 14.4% are employed in low-paying jobs. Survey by Maximusfor the State of
Minnesota (1995).
149. Chambers, supra note 78, at 2596.
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the underground work force to avoid paying support altogether.5 0
Moreover, the Personal Responsibility Act's strict requirements for paternity
establishment and employment tracking may actually encourage underground
jobs' or the use of false social security numbers. 2 These strict requirements, such as new hire registration for employers, will not be effective if
fathers opt out of the legitimate workforce.' 53 The most serious threat
posed by the CSED's reforms is for TANF-families, because poor children
generally have poor fathers.' 5 4
A further criticism surrounds the concern that states might go too far to
enforce child support payments. Advocates of increasing government
involvement suggest the federal government should create job programs for
the fathers who cannot afford to pay.'55 Such job programs would elicit
money from fathers who are otherwise working in the underground work
force.' 56 One critic fears that the recent reforms are so focused on enforcing child support that the application of these reforms could ultimately expand
into creating
penal work camps for fathers who are delinquent in support
57
payments.1
To handle these concerns, advocates of government action support a
federally financed child support assurance program. Child support assurance
is a program which would guarantee child support payments to families
involved in the federally funded child support enforcement program,
regardless of whether the father actually makes his payments."" While
critics of child support assurance argue that the program would be too costly
for the federal government, advocates reason that the Personal Responsibility
Act's reforms will lessen the government's financial welfare burdens and
make a child support assurance plan fiscally viable.'59

150. However, a recent study found no correlation between child support enforcement and
legitimate employment. Id. at 2596-97.
151. Id. at 2597.
152. Weeland remarks, supra note 95.
153. Under the Personal Responsibility Act, employers are to report their new hires' social
security numbers to new hire databases. Personal Responsibility Act, § 313, 110 Stat. at 2210
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. sec. 653(a), § 453(A)(b)(1)(B) (1997)). If fathers work

underground, however, no social security number is necessary, so there is no way to track the
fathers or the compliance of the employers.
154. Chambers, supra note 78, at 2594 (citing DONALD HERNANDEZ, AMERICA'S
CHILDREN: RESOURCES FROM FAMILY, GOVERNMENT, AND THE ECONOMY 310-11 (1993));

GWENDOLYN MINK, THE WAGES OF MOTHERHOOD: WOMEN'S INEQUALITY IN THE WELFARE

STATE (1995) at 187.
155. Sugarman, supra note 17, at 2571.
156. Spalter-Roth statement, supra note 18.
157. Chambers, supra note 78, at 2598. In Massachusetts, one father who refused to pay
his increasing child support payments was offered jail or participation in the Fair Share Program.
He chose the program.
Id. (citing Andrea K. Walker, Welfare Plans Take Fathers into
Account: PilotProgramsHelp Men Work, Learn, Support Their Children, BOSTON GLOBE, June
18, 1995, at 6).
158. Melia testimony, supra note 96.
159. Id.
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Some critics of both child support assurance and enforcement programs
argue that neither should be used to reform welfare.

According to these

critics, even with child support assurance or enforcement, needy families will
still need additional government assistance because poor families generally

have poor fathers. 6 '

Child support enforcement cannot be a successful

Further, child
welfare reform because the fathers have nothing to give.'
support assurance or enforcement could foster unwanted contact between
fathers and families. 6
In contrast, advocates focus on the efficiency of both child support en-

forcement and assurance systems. Under a child support assurance system,
efficiency in child support collection would rapidly increase because "the

government bears the cost" when payments are not collected.'63 Currently,
if the CSED cannot collect payment for the family or the father is too poor
to pay, the family suffers."6 Putting the burden on the government, rather
than the family, should motivate the government to increase its collection

rate. 6
In addition, advocates reason that child support assurance is a
beneficial reform because it would help to decrease the welfare rolls. Under
the Personal Responsibility Act, child paternity should be established early so

the CSEDs can collect child support awards sooner. An efficient CSED

could help families avoid the need to enter the TANF rolls.' 66 Further, the

child support assurance program would not deny payments to working
mothers, so it promotes the Personal Responsibility Act's personal responsibility work incentives.' 67

Another overall criticism of the Personal Responsibility Act is that, while
beneficial in many ways, it does not go far enough to motivate state efficiency. One proposal is to eliminate procedural audits altogether and offer

federal funds only to states which meet certain levels of productivity. 6 '
Under this proposed system, federal funds would be completely dependent on
160. See supra note 154.
161. Mink, supra note 154, at 187.
162. Id. One critic comments, "To create a direct relationship between a father's wages and
the children's economic security would suggests an exchange relationship in which a mother's
right to raise her children independently is traded for the father's access to those children." Id.
at 188.
163. Roberts, supra note 73, at 79.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. In the past, many AFDC mothers did not assist CSEDs in establishing their child's
paternity because they were satisfied with AFDC benefits. Weeland remarks, supra note 95.
While the Personal Responsibility Act forces mothers to comply with paternity establishment,
child support assurance could be an even bigger incentive because families could be guaranteed
child support benefits for life, rather than the five year limit under the Personal Responsibility
Act. Melia testimony, supra note 96.
167. Melia testimony, supra note 96; see supra note 37.
168. On a national level, the cost for such a program has been equated with the former
procedural auditing process, yet with a greater benefit being derived from expended funds. Id.
Under the Personal Responsibility Act, audits primarily focus on results; however, procedural
audits have not entirely been eliminated.
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results; therefore, the most productive states would benefit with increased
funding. 69 This procedure, however, may not increase innovation and
could result in less overall effectiveness for poorer states with low productivity who cannot compete with more productive states. 17
In response,
proponents argue that less productivity in a state or locality would hurt it
financially, yet force it to innovate to increase productivity with lesser'
funds. 171 The new productivity-based audit process will help all states and
localities to be more efficient from the start because time and energy can be
focused
on obtaining results instead of following trivial procedural guide72
lines.
While there are many critics of the Personal Responsibility Act, there are
many advocates of reforming welfare through child support enforcement.' 73
Problems with the Personal Responsibility Act do exist; however, it is still the
most positive change in welfare the country has ever seen.
IV. CREATING A CHILD SUPPORT ASSURANCE PROGRAM

Many of the criticisms of the Personal Responsibility Act could be alleviated by the implementation of a child support assurance program. While
numerous concerns must be addressed in implementing such a large program,
a properly constructed program could be quite successful in lowering the
welfare rolls and enforcing child support payments.
A child support assurance system is a radical concept, yet one that could
greatly benefit our nation, as well as many families in need. As explained
above, under a child support assurance program, the eligible family receives
monthly child support payments from the government regardless of whether
the father actually pays his support obligation on time and in full each
month.' 74 There are many opponents to such a program, but the following
suggestions acknowledge the fact that criticisms exist and pose solutions to
some of the more pressing concerns.
Due to the significant costs involved in assuring child support payments,
the initial program size should be limited when first constructing a child
support assurance program. Legislation should require that all families
enrolling in the assurance program be eligible for welfare. This requirement
will limit the number of families that the program must aid, while helping the

169. Id.
170. Reasoning taken from critics' reaction against the Personal Responsibility Act's
already implemented sanctions. See Bingaman statement, supra note 54.
171. Melia testimony, supra note 96. An example of an inexpensive innovation to increase
productivity is the establishment of paternity in the hospital as opposed to expensive court
proceedings which cost over $500. Id.

172. Id.
173. Supporters' statements include: Hamilton remarks, supra note 13; Melia testimony,
supra note 96; Spalter-Roth statement, supra note 18; and Jones Jordon testimony, supra note
174. Melia testimony, supra note 96.
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families that are in the most dire need of child support.' 5
Further, legislation should mandate that a valid child support order must
be established before a family can be eligible for child support assurance.
This limitation will also restrict the number of families that can initially enroll
in the program. As of 1994, only 39.5% of welfare families had child
support orders which were not being complied with,176 so the initial
financial burden on the child support assurance program would not be unduly
burdensome. Additionally, by making child support orders a prerequisite to
enrolling in the assurance program, the government is guaranteed information
as to the paternity of the child in question, therefore, collection of delinquent
payments would be made significantly easier. This should also increase the
number of paternities established by CSEDs because it encourages welfare
mothers who want to receive assured child support and leave the welfare roles
to cooperate and seek child support orders.
In constructing child support assurance legislation, one of the most
important concerns for legislators should be to protect the program from
abuse. The potential for abuse is that the program could give many families
the incentive to collect child support from the assurance program without
concern for the fact that their child support orders are not being paid by the
fathers who owe them.' 77 Legislators should try to curtail program abuse

by requiring all families in the assurance program to assist with CSED efforts
by continually providing all necessary information to collect payment from
the delinquent fathers. This requirement is similar to the Personal Responsibility Act's paternity establishment provision which conditions welfare
eligibility on a mother's active assistance in identifying and locating the
father of her child. 7 With active assistance as a requirement for child
support assurance, families are not permitted to rely on child support
assurance without bearing in mind it is the father who is obligated to pay
monthly support.
In addition to protecting the government from program abuse, it is
important to protect the families from potential physical abuse. Many
175. Other child support assurance advocates have argued that offering this program to
welfare families is problematic because welfare benefits decrease based on increases in family
income. IRWIN GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT: AN EXTENSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY
142-43 (1992). However, properly constructed legislation would not remove all public
assistance from needy families simply because they are enrolled in the child support assurance
program. Further, as will be discussed, narrowly defined exceptions in child support assurance
legislation could help those families who could be financially burdened by a decrease in welfare
benefits.
176. The 39.5% figure is derived from the following information: Twelve and one half
percent of all welfare families nationally have their child support orders enforced, NINETEENTH
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, and 52% of AFDC recipients had child support orders in 1994,
Id. at 33. Therefore, 39.5% of welfare families are left eligible for and in need of child support
assurance.
177. See GARFINKEL, supra note 175, at 143-44.
178. See Personal Responsibility Act, § 333, 110 Stat. at 2230-31 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. sec. 654, § 454(3) (1997), as amended by § 301(b), § 303(a), and § 313(a) of this
act).
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families on welfare are survivors of domestic abuse. 7 9 Therefore, any
method of child support enforcement could produce contact between the
father and the family, and consequently, renewed opportunities for abuse.
Legislators should take this concern into account and provide an exception
which allows these families to collect TANF and decline to participate in the
child support assurance program.'
In this way, families can avoid abusive
fathers without losing their welfare assistance.
Additionally, undue financial hardship could als6 pose a problem for the
few families which have child support orders smaller than TANF monthly
assistance would provide.
An exception similar to the one exempting
participation by physically abused families would solve this dilemma by
assuring that poorer families are not penalized by mandatory participation in
the child support assurance program.'
While on TANF, a family's child
support could still be enforced through the CSEDs' methods. However, in
the meantime, the family is not forced to live on less income than welfare
would grant.
A child support assurance program would initially be costly to implement
since few support checks would be received from the fathers of program
participants to repay program expenditures, and the average monthly2
payments can be significantly higher than average welfare benefits.1
However, child support assurance could be financially viable because the
legislative suggestions described above limit eligibility and remain focused on
enforcing child support obligations from the father. The system is assured a
process of slow implementation because the program only assures child
support payments for the initially few welfare families with valid support
orders.
The intent of a child support assurance program is not to replace the
welfare system but to decrease welfare roles and increase CSED efficiency.
As the Personal Responsibility Act reforms allow for the establishment of
more paternities and child support orders, the child support assurance rolls
will inevitably increase. However, the welfare and child support enforcement
systems will be much more efficient under the Personal Responsibility Act,
so the net cost to the state should still be less than current welfare expenditures. Under a child support assurance system, once a father is forced to pay
179. One study revealed that 60% of AFDC recipients have been victims of domestic abuse.
Lynn Smith, 90's Family: What Happens to Battered Women When the Safely Net Is Cut?, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1996, at E2.
180. Under the Personal Responsibility Act, there is no codified exception from their
obligation to help establish a child's paternity for families which could face physical abuse if
paternity is established or a court order is enforced. See supra note 111.
181. Given the fact that welfare eligibility is a prerequisite to enrolling in the child support
assurance program, legislation should include a provision allowing for automatic enrollment in
the child support assurance program once welfare benefits are terminated. Otherwise, once a
family exceeds their five year lifetime limit on welfare, they lose all support, including child
support assurance program eligibility. See Personal Responsibility Act, § 103, 110 Stat. at 2137
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. see. 608, § 408(a)(7)(A) (1997)).
182. See supra note 6.
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child support payments regularly, he should also be liable for all overdue
payments that the state has previously paid to the family, including interest
and costs.'
Therefore, while this system might be costly to implement at
first, it will eventually pay for itself with an ever increasing number of fathers
being forced to make back payments." 4
The Personal Responsibility Act's welfare reforms would be complemented by a child support assurance program because they both pursue the
same goals of encouraging personal responsibility and increasing the
efficiency of the child support enforcement program.
Child support
assurance will lower the welfare rolls by protecting family income through
the assurance of regularly paid, court ordered child support payments. While
it may be argued that child support assurance simply allows welfare families
to collect state funds from a new program with a different name, child
support assurance does more than welfare because it encourages CSEDs to be
more efficient in collecting child support." 5 It also gives families a higher
degree of financial security because of the significant difference86 in monthly
income between welfare benefits and child support payments.
The long term effects of a child support assurance program are the most
compelling reasons to implement such a program. First, families who
formerly received late, partial, or no payments from delinquent fathers are
guaranteed monthly payments on time and in full each month. Second, the
child support assurance program encourages mothers to establish paternity in
order to get an assured and enforceable child support order.'87 Third, the
state will become even more driven to establish child support orders and
collect payments because the state is financially responsible when it fails to
do so.! Fourth, the welfare rolls will significantly decline as more and
more families acquire child support orders."8 Finally, the five year limit
on welfare will not be as devastating for families who are not financially
independent by the time they become ineligible for welfare. Child support
assurance may be costly to implement at first, but when one considers the
long term effects, child support assurance becomes a desirable alternative to
the welfare rolls.

183. See Roberts, supra note 73, at 79.
184. Ideally, once a child support assurance program benefiting welfare families became
financially stable, it could be expanded to assure child support payments for all families with
valid support orders, regardless of their financial income. For a proposal for nationalized child
support assurance regardless of financial need, see GARFINKEL, supra note 175, at 42-61.
185. See GARFINKEL, supra note 175, at 49.
186. See supra note 6.
187. See GARFINKEL, supra note 175, at 49.
188. Roberts, supranote 73, at 79.

189. See GARFINKEL, supra note 175, at 48.
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CONCLUSION

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 contains the most radical welfare reforms in the history of welfare
and child support enforcement. One commentator noted, while there are
many flaws in the Personal Responsibility Act, "the bill probably represents
our best hope for figuring out how to solve the problems of the poor and
underclass." 9 ' One of the Personal Responsibility Act's greatest benefits is
the current focus on increasing child support enforcement to offset welfare
costs through parent contribution. Additionally, it will help to secure
independence for welfare families by using enforcement programs to reduce
the need for welfare entirely.'91 The new focus on Child Support Enforcement Divisions' productivity should increase state CSEDinnovation and
efficiency because local divisions can spend more time establishing paternities
and collecting support instead of spending time conforming to time-consuming federal procedural guidelines. While some may argue that child support
enforcement is futile as a means of lowering welfare rolls because nearly 40%
of welfare families have fathers who will never be able to pay, there are still
over 60% of welfare families who could benefit. 92 If even half of those
families were to receive child support, it would still be a significant
improvement considering only 12.5% of all welfare families received any
support as of 1994.'9'
The majority of the Personal Responsibility Act's reforms will be a
welcome change to our welfare and child support enforcement systems.
However, even with the Personal Responsibility Act's radical welfare
changes, room still exists for continued reform. One solution is to initiate a
child support assurance program which could help fill the needs of many
families who would be financially independent if their monthly child support
orders were paid on time and in full. Such an assurance program could be
costly to implement at first, but the long term effects should make it
worthwhile.
The Personal Responsibility Act forces all the states to seek new ways
to manage rising welfare costs because block grants result in limited funds.
An efficient child support enforcement system will aid in reimbursing state
welfare costs directly through support checks owed to families benefiting
from the program. With new and efficient child support enforcement
methods, states can afford to help more eligible families in need. Ideally,

190. Hamilton remarks, supra note 13.
191. 142 CONG. REC. S9322-02 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Roth).
192. See supra note 148.
193. See supra note 3.
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under the Personal Responsibility Act, many families will soon be able to

survive financially without government assistance.

Ann Marie .Rotondo"
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